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A State Law Approach to Preserving
Fair Use in Acad em ic Libraries
David R. Hansen*
Every year academic libraries spend millions of dollars to
provide their users access to copyrighted works. Much of that
money goes not toward purchasing physical copies of books or
journals, but toward licensing electronic content from publishers.
In those electronic license agreements, the default rules for how
users interact with copyrighted content is often altered, and
academic library users are deprived of basic rights—especially
rights such as fair use—which are granted under federal copyright
law. The literature is flush with discussion of the misuse of private
contracts to alter the rights granted by Congress in copyright’s
statutory scheme. As a result, there have been many proposals to
maintain copyright’s balance between content owners’ and users’
rights through either the adoption of model licenses or changes to
federal law.
Because those proposals have thus far failed to slow private
contracts’ fervent erosion of users’ rights, this paper proposes a
modest state-law solution to the problem for one class of users that
is especially hurt by this change: academic library users. This
paper envisions a state law that would render void any contract
provision between a rights holder and a state institution that
modifies or eliminates fair use for users. This approach is
especially valuable in preserving fair use for public academic
library users—a class of users for whom fair use is particularly
important given their interest in free speech, academic freedom,
and the creation of new, innovative uses for creative works. Given

* Thanks to Lolly Gasaway, Barbara Moran, Kevin Smith and, of course, Janice Hansen,
for their many helpful comments.
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the growth in general of licensing (an area largely governed by
state law) this proposal is also a useful starting place for
discussion about the use of state law to preserve users’ rights in
copyrighted works.
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INTRODUCTION
For years now, academic libraries have spent their money
licensing copyrighted content. In the past, a book was a book, and
libraries were free to lend, manipulate, or even destroy the copies
of the works that they had purchased. The doctrine of first-sale
permitted such activities.1 Likewise, library users were able to
copy, redistribute, and transform content so long as those uses fell
within the amorphous bounds of ―fair use.‖2 But for the last
1

17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). See generally Aaron Parzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital
Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011) (discussing the doctrine of first sale and the
broader principle of ―exhaustion,‖ and explaining how the doctrine is perceived of as of
as having limited usefulness as applied to digital distribution).
2
Id. § 107.
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several years, the percentage of academic library expenditures on
licensed electronic content has dwarfed that of traditional print
acquisitions. In 2008–2009, fifty-seven percent of Association of
Research Library (―ARL‖) member materials expenditures were
devoted to licensed electronic content.3 In total, ARL libraries
spent over $700 million on electronic resources in that same time
period, compared to only about $77 million ten years earlier in
1998–1999 (constituting about ten percent of total materials
expenditures for that year).4 Nearly all of this new electronic
content is licensed to libraries under either perpetual or recurring
terms.5 Those licenses are contracts that change the default rules
for how libraries and their users interact with copyrighted content.6
The new norm among libraries is licensing access, not purchasing
copies; this change can mean a significant reduction in library
users‘ rights.7
Because of this shift, much has been written on how libraries
(and users in general) deal with licenses. The literature focuses on
two of the most noxious aspects of licenses. The first is the reality
that licenses are legal documents drafted by lawyers, which can
3

ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR., ARL STATISTICS 2008–2009 20–21 (2010), available at
http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/arlstat09.pdf [hereinafter ARL STATISTICS]. Association of
Research Libraries (―ARL‖) membership is made up of ―126 research libraries at
comprehensive, research-extensive institutions in the U.S. and Canada.‖ About ARL,
ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/arl/index.shtml (last visited July 31, 2011).
4
ARL STATISTICS, supra note 3.
5
See Duncan E. Alford, Negotiating and Analyzing Electronic License Agreements,
94 L. LIBR. J. 621, 640 (noting that while some are of the view that publishers should
provide perpetual access to material, license agreements are more valuable to publishers
when they require recurring payments); see also Kristin H. Gerhard, Pricing Models for
Electronic Journals and Other Electronic Academic Materials: The State of the Art, 42 J.
LIBR. ADMIN. 1, 13 (2005).
6
As a general point, use and access issues associated with electronic content may
extend well beyond the actual terms of the license itself. See Ann Bartow, Some Peer-toPeer, Democratically, and Voluntarily-Produced Thoughts, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 451, 464–65 (2007) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:
HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006)) (―Most
electronic publications are licensed, rather than sold, under terms and conditions that may
not be readily negotiable. It is not at all clear that digitization enhances access, and it
may instead be true that it decreases the scope of collections over time, because when a
subscription runs out, even the back issues of a periodical may be rendered
unavailable.‖).
7
See id.
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make them difficult to read, interpret, and negotiate without
previous legal experience.8 In contract-law terms, these are
onerous procedural elements of contract formation through which
librarians must navigate to achieve access for their users. 9 The
second aspect that is regularly explored is how licenses change the
default rules of copyright which dictate how users may interact
with creative content.10
These substantive modifications—
especially when considered across the amalgam of licenses that
academic libraries enter into—create a patchwork of users‘ rights
that is more restrictive than what copyright law naturally provides,
and that stifles normal academic exploitation of the subject
copyrighted works.11
This paper focuses on the substantive changes that licenses
make—alteration of default legal rules, with particular regard to
the fair use right—and explains how proposed solutions to
preserve the balance of rights between rights holders and users
have not been particularly effective. So far, proposals to remedy
the situation have been either too ambitious or too conservative in
scope. Proposals to rectify the situation at the federal level—either
through Congress or the courts—are appealing, but fail to
realistically gauge the likelihood of these politically-fraught
modifications to copyright law in the current political climate.
Likewise, the growing panoply of voluntary model licenses and
best practices fails to recognize the necessity of uniformity and
enforceability in both the law and practice.
After explaining the importance of maintaining copyrights‘
balance of rights for academic library users (focusing heavily on

8

Licensing Digital Information: Introduction, YALE UNIV. LIBR. LIBLICENSE, (2006),
http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/index.shtml [LIBLICENSE, Introduction].
9
Scrutinizing the conscionability of a contract is sometimes done by splitting the
analysis into two, looking first at the procedure of contract formation (procedural
unconscionability) and then at the actual substance of the contract terms (substantive
unconscionability). This approach was pioneered by Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code: The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967), and has been
adopted by many courts. This paper does not suggest that licensing terms that impinge
on educational fair use rights are necessarily unconscionable, but uses the proceduralsubstantive framework to facilitate the discussion in familiar terms.
10
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11
Id.
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fair use), this paper explores three currently proposed potential
solutions: federal intervention, voluntary model licenses, and
wholesale modification of state contract law. Because those
reforms have thus far proved ineffective, this paper suggests a
more limited solution that uses state law as way to maintain
balance, at least in the context of academic library licensing.
Namely, this paper proposes a state-law restriction on public
institutions that would render void any contract terms entered into
between rights holders and state institutions that eliminate or
modify the scope of fair use. After outlining the strengths and
weaknesses of such a change, the paper concludes by suggesting
other areas of concern that may be addressed with similar state-law
changes.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH LICENSES
Licenses serve an important role in academic libraries. They
establish the ground rules by which vendors and libraries interact.12
They memorialize hard-negotiated prices, subscription packages,
and other details of what, exactly, libraries will pay and what they
will get in exchange for their payments.13 While some of these
terms are common to any contract—and may even remain
unstated, left to be filled in by the default rules of commercial
contract law14—licenses also address important goals that are
12

See generally Principles for Licensing Electronic Resources, ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR.
(July 15, 1997), http://www.arl.org/sc/marketplace/license/licprinciples.shtml.
13
See, e.g., Ebsco Publishing License Agreement, EBSCO HOST, http://support.ebsco
host.com/ehost/terms.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). See generally Kristen M.
Cichocki, Unlocking the Future of Public Libraries: Digital Licensing that Preserves
Access, 16 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 40 (2007).
14
The rules of contract law have long been conceived of as the default rules which
apply to fill in gaps left either intentionally or unintentionally in contracts. The classic
article explaining this view is Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner‘s Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is one such set of contract rules that has been
created to provide a uniform set of gap-filling provisions for contracts dealing with the
sale of goods. UCC art. 2. An alternative set of UCC provisions—originally dubbed UCC
Article 2B—is the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), which
was created in an attempt to provide alternative default rules to address the difficulties of
electronic commerce, specifically addressing things such as software licensing and online
transactions. See infra notes 113–19 and accompanying text (discussing UCITA and
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peculiar to academic libraries, such as setting terms for
preservation, access, privacy, and maintenance of digital content
contained in databases.15 Licenses and licensing negotiations
provide great benefit to academic libraries that wish to carefully
tailor subscriptions to their institutional needs.16 At the same time,
even carefully drafted licenses can be costly to negotiate and may
still leave libraries (and their users) without the rights on which
they rely for normal academic uses of the underlying works.17
A. Problems
Given the sheer scale of electronic subscriptions and purchases,
librarians must spend a great deal of time reading and evaluating
the terms of their electronic licenses.18 The literature is replete
with guides to understanding and managing licenses in academic
libraries.19 Perhaps because of the breadth of issues that license
contracts must consider, they can easily become complicated legal
documents.20 Typically drafted by a lawyer, the terms of these
contracts are often long, confusing, and ambiguous.21 From the
library‘s perspective, negotiating these contracts can be difficult,
especially because many of the terms are presented as nonnegotiable.22 Although large academic libraries are sophisticated
enough to know that some negotiation may be possible, take-it-or-

related attempts to address some of the ―procedural‖ issues with contract formation).
Modifying default contract rules to address the imbalance of rights that has arisen
because of the licensing of digitally distributed content may be an appealing alternative to
the more limited approach advocated in this paper, and is an area worthy of further study.
15
See Cichocki, supra note 13, at 40; Libraries and Licensing, AM. LIBR. ASS‘N,
http://www.ala.org/ala/issuesadvocacy/copyright/librariesandlicensing/LibrariesAnd
Licensing.cfm (last updated Aug. 25, 2006).
16
See Principles for Licensing Electronic Resources, supra note 12 (noting that
negotiation is important in arriving at ―mutually acceptable‖ terms in a license).
17
See generally id.
18
See generally LIBLICENSE, Introduction, supra note 8.
19
See, e.g., KARAN RUPP-SERRANO, LICENSING IN LIBRARIES: PRACTICAL AND ETHICAL
ASPECTS (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the practical and legal issues that arise with using
licensed content on campus); LESLEY ELLEN HARRIS, LICENSING DIGITAL CONTENT: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR LIBRARIANS (2d ed. 2009).
20
See LIBLICENSE, Introduction, supra note 8.
21
Id.
22
See Anna May Wyatt, Licenses, the Law, and Libraries, 42 J. LIBR. ADMIN. 163, 163
(2005).
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leave-it ―adhesion contracts‖ like these force libraries to spend
resources haggling over terms that may or may not be alterable.23
Procedural costs of contract formation can also rise quickly
because, while vendors present these contracts as standard-form,
the contracts actually vary significantly from vendor to vendor.24
Even terms that appear uniform may not have a uniform meaning
from contract to contract, and understanding and negotiating these
terms can be time consuming.25 For example, one recent question
regarding a license limitation, providing that users of licensed
works can only engage in ―non-commercial use,‖26 sparked a
listserv debate over the meaning of the term among librarians from
across the country.27 Does the ―non-commercial use‖ clause mean
that just ―profit-producing‖ uses are prohibited, or is cost-recovery
allowed? Basic contract terms like these can become even more
complicated with the incorporation and misuse of technical legal
terms.28
Of course, the formation of almost any contract is subject to the
same criticism. But for academic libraries, which license literally
millions of works from thousands of vendors, the problem is
exacerbated; they must spend enormous amounts of time
evaluating, discussing, and negotiating many individual licenses

23

See Gerhard, supra note 5, at 15.
See Stephen Bosch, Using Model Licenses, 42 J. LIBR. ADMIN. 66, 67 (2005).
25
See id. at 66.
26
E.g., Ebsco Publishing License Agreement, supra note 13 (stating simply that
―[r]emote access to the Databases or Services is permitted to patrons of subscribing
institutions accessing from remote locations for personal, non-commercial use.‖). Other
license terms are more specific. E.g., Terms and Conditions of Use, JSTOR,
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp (last visited Apr. 30, 2011)
(stating ―Institutional Licensees and users may not . . . use or authorize the use of the
JSTOR Platform or Content for commercial purposes or gains, including charging a feefor-service for the use of JSTOR beyond reasonable printing or administrative costs. For
purposes of clarification, ‗commercial purposes or gains‘ shall not include research
whose end-use is commercial in nature.‖).
27
See Posting of Charles Hamaker, cahamake@uncc.edu, to liblicense1@lists.yale.edu (Feb. 28, 2011, 21:57 EST), available at http://www.library.yale.edu/~
llicense/ListArchives/1103/msg00001.html.
28
See Bosch, supra note 24, at 73.
24
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separately.29 Given the difficulties in the procedure of contract
formation (nevermind the substantive terms of the agreements), it
is unsurprising that librarians have taken these issues seriously,30
resulting in the creation of a whole host of model licenses and best
practices,31 and instigating calls for more thorough legal education
of librarians at ALA-library schools.32
In terms of contract substance, licenses can be problematic for
academic libraries because licenses restrict the way that libraries
and their users interact with copyrighted content.33 Federal
copyright law grants authors (or their assignees—typically
publishers) certain exclusive rights over the works they create.34
Exceptions to those exclusive rights exist for the benefit of users
and the public at large.35 Congress crafted federal copyright law, it
has been said, to strike a delicate balance between the rights of
copyright owners and those of the user-public.36
In striking that balance, authors are given the exclusive right to
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the

29

The problem of varying license terms has been extensively considered and
addressed through the proposal of a variety of standard license terms. For a more
thorough discussion, see infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text.
30
The sheer volume of library-licensing literature is a testament to how seriously
librarians have taken this issue. LibLicense, a website devoted to library licensing issues,
maintains this thorough a bibliography of library licensing resources. Licensing of Digital
Information: Bibliography of Licensing Sources, YALE UNIV. LIBR. LIBLICENSE,
http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/bibliogr.shtml (last visited Apr. 24, 2011) (listing
well over 100 sources that discuss licensing issues for libraries in depth).
31
See infra notes 99–119 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed model
licenses as solutions to library licensing problems).
32
See William M. Cross & Phillip M. Edwards, Preservice Legal Education for
Academic Librarians Within ALA-Accredited Degree Programs, 11 PORTAL: LIBR. &
ACAD. 533, 541 (2011).
33
See David C. Fowler, Licensing: An Historical Perspective, 42 J. LIBR. ADMIN. 177,
179–83 (2005).
34
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (listing six exclusive rights); 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006)
(copyright ownership vests initially in the author of the work).
35
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–20 (2006) (listing exceptions to the exclusive rights of
copyright owners).
36
See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (―[A]lthough dissemination of
creative works is a goal of the Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the
artist‘s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the
public‘s need for access to creative works.‖).
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public, and perform the copyrighted work publicly.37 Balancing
against authors‘ broad rights are a number of exceptions and
limitations intended to benefit users. Included among these are
specific statutory exceptions for face-to-face and distance
education,38 library preservation,39 as well as the ―first sale‖
limitation,40 which is particularly useful in the library context
because it allows purchasers, but not licensees, of copies of
copyrighted works to freely transfer (sell, lend, inter-library loan)
their legally acquired copies. The broadest and most difficult to
apply exception, however, is likely that of fair use,41 an ―equitable
rule of reason‖ that permits users to make unauthorized uses of
copyrighted works under certain circumstances.42 The discussion
below focuses on how licenses change the scope of fair use with
respect to uses of materials in academic libraries; however, many
of the same observations can also be made with respect to the other
exceptions mentioned above.
Fair use is the most general and most ambiguous exception to
the exclusive rights of copyright owners.
It permits the
unauthorized use of copyrighted works whenever its four-factor,
―context-specific‖ balancing test weighs in the user‘s favor.43 Fair
uses include such statutorily-favored areas of use such as
―criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or

37
Id. § 106(1)–(4). That statute also grants special exclusive rights with respect to the
public display of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works and for the public performance of sound recordings
by means of a digital audio transmission. Id. § 106(5)–(6).
38
Id. § 110(1)–(2).
39
See, e.g., id. § 108.
40
See id. § 109(a) (first sale doctrine); see generally Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210
U.S. 339 (1908) (identifying the first sale limitation). First sale is another doctrine whose
importance for libraries has eroded with the rise of digital distribution and licensing. See
generally Parzanowski & Schultz, supra note 1.
41
See 17 U.S.C. § 107; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 19 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 (―The judicial doctrine of fair use [is] one of the most
important and well-established limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners.‖).
42
See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 20 (―[S]ince the [fair use] doctrine is an equitable rule
of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts.‖).
43
See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090, 1096–99
(2007) (explaining the context-specific nature of the fair use analysis).
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research,‖44 but also include more imprecise applications, such as
those which generally involve some type of ―transformative
use.‖45 The factors themselves focus on (1) the purpose and
character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.46
The application of fair use in the context of higher education,
and academic libraries in particular, is well recognized both in the
literature and by the courts.47 Section 107, the statutory section
which outlines fair use, specifically calls out uses for ―teaching,
scholarship, and research‖ as being within the scope of the
doctrine,48 and goes on to identify ―nonprofit educational
purposes‖ as weighing at least one of the statutory factors toward a
finding fair use.49 Further, although the burden of proving fair use
44

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding that 2 Live
Crew‘s commercial parody of Roy Orbison‘s song ―Oh, Pretty Woman‖ was
―transformative‖ (and fair use) because it changed the work by adding ―new expression,
meaning, or message‖); Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (1990); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721–22
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a search engine‘s thumbnail reproduction of entire
copyrighted images for inclusion in a search results page was ―transformative‖).
46
17 U.S.C. § 107. Note that the text merely states that ―[i]n determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include [the four factors].‖ Id. The purpose of the codification of fair use was to restate
fair use, not to supplant the judge-made nature of the doctrine, and courts are still free to
consider other factors and apply it to new areas, such as digital distribution in the context
of academic libraries. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 21 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680 (―Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is
and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to
particular situations on a case-by-case basis. Section 107 is intended to restate the present
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.‖).
47
See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (stating that the fair use doctrine ―‗avoid[s]
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very
creativity that the law is designed to foster‘‖ (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495, U.S. 207, 236
(1990))). See generally Carol M. Silberberg, Note, Preserving Educational Fair Use in
the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (2001) (summarizing the state of fair
use in higher education).
48
17 U.S.C. § 107. Note that three of the seven statutory examples (teaching,
scholarship, and research) are uses directly facilitated by academic libraries.
49
Id. § 107(1) (―In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of
45
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rests firmly on the defendant asserting the defense,50 there is at
least some statutory and judicial warrant for a presumption that
part of the fair use analysis weighs in favor of educational uses,
especially in the context of non-profit libraries.51 Section 108,
which grants additional, specific exceptions for library
preservation purposes, provides that nothing in that section ―in any
way affects the right of fair use.‖52 Although Section 108 has
received virtually no judicial interpretation, the view that fair use is
a right—not a defense—of libraries and their users is at least
aspirationally shared by some librarians:
Even though librarians likely hold other core values
related to copyright, the last one critical to mention
is fair use. To librarians, fair use is a user‘s right
and not just a defense to copyright infringement. . . .
The word used in the statute is ―right‖ and not
―privilege‖ . . . .53
Further, the examples of fair uses (―criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research,‖54) provided in
the preamble to section 107 are almost all types of uses that
libraries facilitate. While these examples of uses are afforded no

the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes . . . .‖). The commerciality or non-profit nature of the use is not,
however, determinative. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (―[T]he mere fact that a use is
educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any
more than the commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness.‖).
50
See H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553
(asserting fair use is an affirmative defense); id. at 9 n.3 (stating that the burden of
proving fair use is always on the party asserting the defense); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569
(raising fair use as an affirmative defense in response to a claim of infringement).
51
But see Brownmark Films, L.L.C. v. Comedy Partners, No. 10-CV-1013, 2011 WL
2648600, at *5 (E.D. Wis. July 6, 2011) (―[T]he central issue is whether this court can
resolve a motion to dismiss in the defendants‘ favor because of the existence of the
affirmative defense of fair use. . . . [but] an affirmative defense can be the basis for a
dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) when the allegations of the complaint and
material that expressly referenced the complaint and is central to the plaintiff‘s claim ‗set
forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.‘‖) (internal citations
omitted).
52
17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (emphasis added).
53
Laura N. Gasaway, Values Conflict in the Digital Environment: Librarians Versus
Copyright Holders, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 115, 123 (2000).
54
17 U.S.C. § 107.
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presumptive weight in the fair use analysis as a whole, at least
some courts have held that uses in accord with these examples are
entitled to a presumption that the first factor (―purpose and
character of the use‖) weighs in favor of a finding of fair use.55
Though no one factor is determinative,56 the first factor—termed
the ―soul‖ of the fair use by some57—is highly correlated to a
finding of fair use.58
There are few cases that directly confront fair use in a nonprofit library setting.59 Indeed, the most frequently cited and
influential cases for academic libraries come not from suits against
55

See NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2004) (―As we held in
Wright, ‗there is a strong presumption that factor one favors the defendant if the allegedly
infringing work fits the description of uses described in § 107.‘‖ (citing Wright v. Warner
Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 736 (2d Cir. 1991))). This view is contested as inconsistent
with the Campbell Court‘s command against presumptions of fair use, but at least in the
Second Circuit, the presumption lives on both in pre- and post-Campbell fair use cases.
See 4 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:12 (Westlaw 2011) (citing the Wright decision and
asserting that it is ―clearly erroneous and has been subsequently overruled by the
Supreme Court‘s Campbell decision.‖).
56
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
57
See Leval, supra note 45, at 116 (―Factor One is the soul of fair use.‖).
58
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 583–85 (2007) (describing the positive statistical
relationship between a favorable finding under the first factor and the overall outcome in
the fair use analysis).
59
See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2582
(2009) (―There is relatively little caselaw on fair use in educational or research
settings.‖). In synthesizing fair use cases, Professor Samuelson goes on to explain that
Because this Article principally aims to analyze clusters of decided
fair use cases, there is relatively little it can say about how courts
would apply fair use as to a wide array of educational and research
uses that lie outside the negotiated guidelines. There are simply too
few decisions to analyze . . . . It is, however, fair to observe that the
small number of litigated educational/research cases contrasts sharply
with the very high volume of everyday educational and research uses
that arguably implicate copyright . . . .
Id. at 2586–87 (citations omitted). Cf. Defendants‘ Proposed Conclusions of Law at 35,
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2011),
ECF No. 411 (―The Court has found no case on point with the present, dealing purely
with the application of the fair use doctrine in the academic environment.‖).
There are now a few major cases that buck this trend. See Cambridge Univ. Press v.
Patton, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 15, 2008) (Justia); Ass‘n for Info.
Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., No. CV 10-09378 CBM (MANx) (C.D.
Ca. filed Dec. 7, 2010) (Justia); The Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, No. 1:2011 CV
06351 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 12, 2011).
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libraries at all, but against copyshops that created unlicensed
coursepacks for classroom use.60 These ―copyshop‖ cases have
uniformly failed to find fair use in the creation and sale of
coursepacks,61 and have led libraries to adopt those rulings as
fearsome precedent for their own practices.62 Those cases,
however, place heavy emphasis on the commercial purpose of the
use by the for-profit copyshops, and do not address how non-profit
academic library uses may alter the analysis.63 Thus, even caselaw
that provides a close analogy to library practices, as these
copyshop cases do, may not be as instructive as librarians have
presumed it to be.
Non-profit educational uses are fondly touted as prime
examples of acceptable fair use,64 but they have received less

60
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir.
1996) (finding no fair use for a commercial copyshop that reproduced and distributed
works for purchase by university students); Basic Books Inc. v. Kinko‘s Graphics Corp.,
758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
61
See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-Use
Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 641–52 (2001) (summarizing multiple ―copyshop‖
cases and finding consistent rejection of fair use in them).
62
See Samuelson, supra note 59, at 2585–86 ([―Copyshop‖ cases] have caused a good
deal of agitation and anxiety in educational, library, and research communities, because
they contribute to fears that publishers are pushing for a rule that if it can be licensed, it
must be licensed . . . .‖).
63
One case, Addison-Wesley Publ‘g. Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82-CIV-8333, 1983 WL
1134, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983), was made out directly against educators, naming
several faculty members in the complaint. See Edwin McDowell, Nine Publishers Sue
N.Y.U., Charging Copyright Violation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1982, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/15/books/nine-publishers-sue-nyu-charging-copyrightviolation.html. This case was of particular importance to universities because publishers
explicitly threatened other universities on the same grounds unless they would agree to
abide by a very rigid set of guidelines for educational fair use. See Crews, supra note 61,
at 640 (―[Universities] followed it because the publishing industry sent hundreds of
letters to colleges and universities throughout the country urging them to adopt the
guidelines or face a risk of litigation.‖ (citing Form Letter from Townsend Hoopes,
President of the Ass‘n of Am. Publishers, Inc., to college and university administrators
(June 10, 1983))). Although the case was settled, it has had a lasting impact on university
and library practice in this area. See id.
64
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584–85 (1994)
(contrasting commercial uses with educational uses, stating ―that the fact that a
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to
weigh against a finding of fair use.‖ (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985))).
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definition by the courts than other uses.65 Given the ambiguity of
the doctrine in the area of educational fair use, this absence of
litigation is surprising. Matters of legal certainty are rarely
litigated,66 but uncertain and dynamic doctrines like fair use are
regularly tested in the courts.67 Indeed, fair use in general has been
heavily litigated,68 but that litigation has remained focused on
commercial or personal uses, and not higher education.69 The
absence of litigation in this context seems to be partly the result of
risk aversion on the part of academics who might otherwise assert
fair use. 70 The net result is an educational fair use right that is
65

See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5679 (―Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and
over again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.‖); see also Beebe, supra
note 58, at 609–10 (noting that uses described as ―news‖ were ultimately successful in
asserting fair use 78% of the time, and ―critical‖ uses 62% of the time, but that
educational or research uses were less certain to succeed—ultimately only 40-48% of the
time); Crews, supra note 61, at 664 (stating that while there are guidelines for acceptable
fair use in educational settings, ―no court ever has read them into law in a legal
decision.‖); Samuelson, supra note 59, at 2541, 2582 (arguing that fair use is in general
―more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have perceived‖ but
recognizing that educational fair use in particular remains unsettled).
66
See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984). The Priest-Klein hypothesis is that cases selected for
litigation or settlement are not chosen at random, but are selected based on ―the expected
costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information the parties possess
about the likelihood of success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement.‖
Id. at 4. The most important assumption of their model is that litigants ―form rational
estimates of the likely decision,‖ which are based, in part, on the settled or unsettled
nature of the law. Id.
67
See generally Beebe, supra note 58 (reviewing nearly 300 fair use decisions decided
between 1978 and 2005).
68
Id.
69
See Silberberg, supra note 47, at 646. See also Samuelson, supra note 59, at 2582–
83.
70
Some have suggested that more certainty is needed for fair uses‘ benefits to be
within the reach of certain classes of risk-averse users. These assertions have led to calls
for the establishment of an administrative fair use rulemaking or adjudication board. See,
e.g., Carroll, supra note 43, at 1087 (proposing the creation of a ―Fair Use Board‖); Mark
Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1413 (2004) (proposing an administrative
dispute resolution process); Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 395, 412–27 (2009) (offering two proposed models of administrative regulation of
fair-use); David Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11, 11–15 (2006) (proposing a panel of ―Fair Use Arbiters‖
appointed by the Register of Copyright). A proposal for a similar body designed to
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strong but ambiguous—a right that rights holders eagerly define
away, and a right that librarians are unsure how to assert.71
Despite higher-education‘s favored status in claiming fair use,
the doctrine‘s ambiguity in this area has caused librarians and
administrators to hesitate in taking advantage of its benefits.
Academic librarians act as ―de facto arbiters of copyright practice
for their institutions,‖72 yet many are reluctant to engage in a fair
use analysis for fear of subjecting their institution to an
infringement suit. In many libraries, ―[d]ecisions are made on the
basis of avoiding copyright difficulties rather than fulfilling [the]
mission.‖73 The fear of fair use is fueled by a belief that the

administer educational fair use has also been made. See David A. Simon, Teaching
Without Infringement: A New Model for Educational Fair Use, 20 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 453, 527–49 (2010).
Most of these proposals are intent on solving two of fair uses‘ most vexing problems
for would-be asserters. The first is that ―[l]iability for copyright infringement is strict,‖
because the exercise of any of the copyright owner‘s exclusive rights under Section 106
makes the fair use asserter a prima facie infringer, who then has the burden of proving
that fair use applies. See Carroll, supra note 43, at 1098. The second is that the
consequences for infringement are severe. Statutory damage awards can be as high as
$150,000 per work infringed, and it is not uncommon for awards in some cases to reach
into the millions. Id. at 1098–99.
For fair use in academic libraries, these two problems are less harsh. First, the
burden of proving fair use by academic libraries (those that qualify for § 108 exceptions)
may well be lower or even reversed as compared to other asserters of fair use. This theory
is untested but, as noted above, supra note 52 and accompanying text, it carries at least
some statutory weight. Furthermore the second problem is mitigated by the fact that
nonprofit educational institutions, libraries, and archives are excepted from statutory
damages so long as they had reasonable grounds for believing the fair use determination
weighed in favor of their use. The statute provides:
The court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an
infringer believed and had reasonable grounds for believing that his
or her use of the copyrighted work was a fair use under section 107,
if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of a nonprofit
educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of
his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives
itself, which infringed by reproducing the work in copies or
phonorecords . . . .
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
71
PRUDENCE ADLER, BRANDON BUTLER, PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, FAIR
USE CHALLENGES IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH LIBRARIES 3 (2010), http://www.
arl.org/bm~doc/arl_csm_fairusereport.pdf.
72
Id. at 5.
73
Id. at 19.
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analysis is so complex, and the result of an incorrect determination
so harmful, that fair use decisions must always be made
conservatively, if at all.74
This attitude extends to others in the university setting. For
example, the University of Texas ―Copyright Crash Course‖ for
academics takes a position on fair use that is common in the
academic environment by asking ―what is fair use?‖
We would all appreciate a clear, crisp answer . . .
but far from clear and crisp, fair use is better
described as a shadowy territory whose boundaries
are disputed, more so now that it includes
cyberspace than ever before. In a way, it‘s like a noman‘s land. Enter at your own risk.75

74
One recent study found that librarians generally believed that ―libraries incur high
risks, including exposure to statutory damages, for good-faith efforts to employ fair use.‖
Id. As discussed above, in many cases this fear is unfounded. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)
(2006); Deborah Gerhardt & Madelyn Wessel, Fair Use and Fairness on Campus, 11
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 461, 504 (2010) (discussing how non-profit academic libraries are
excepted from statutory damage awards when asserting fair use).
This safe haven for educational non-profit fair use is one reason why academic
library fair use determinations are unique. Otherwise, with a range of almost anywhere
between $750 and $150,000 per work infringed the prospect of a statutory damage award
in the face of an incorrect fair use determination can be financially ruinous. Many
commentators and even some courts have concluded that awards on the high end of the
range may be unconstitutional. See Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory
Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439,
480–90 (2009) (arguing that statutory awards on the higher end of the given range are
both ―plainly punitive‖ and ―grossly excessive,‖ violating Due Process as they go beyond
the guideposts for punitive damage awards established by the Supreme Court in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996)); Memorandum of Law &
Order at 8, 34–35, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. July
27, 2011) (holding a statutory damage award unconstitutionally excessive even under the
less rigorous standard for non-punitive awards).
75
Office of the General Counsel, California Institute of Technology, Fair Use, CAL.
INST. OF TECH., http://www.ogc.caltech.edu/forms/fairuse (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).
Since this paper was written, the University of Texas‘ ―Crash Course‖ has now tempered
its assessment of fair use. See UNIV. OF TEX. LIBR., Copyright Crash Course: Fair Use of
Copyrighted Materials, UNIV. OF TEX., http://copyright.lib.utexas.edu/copypol2.html (last
visited Oct. 11, 2011).
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Because of its inherent ambiguity, fair use is often a last resort
for those hoping to find a way to use copyrighted content. 76 Riskaverse librarians faced with such uncertainty are unwilling or
unable to marshal the resources necessary to make fair use
determinations, and instead rely on licenses that provide a quick
and a simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ answer to each proposed use.77 Fair
use analysis requires time, thought, and an understanding of the
underlying legal and practical risks. The legal education of
librarians who would make these decisions, however, can be
lacking or nonexistent,78 and even those comfortable with the
analysis are forced to rely on a thin record of case law which
addresses on-campus fair use only at the fringes.79
Despite its ambiguity, asserting fair use in the university setting
is important. For one, assertion of the fair use right is, in many
respects, an assertion of First Amendment free speech rights. Fair
use has been widely discussed as the copyright act‘s ―internal
safety valve,‖80 protecting users‘ rights to free expression from
excessive limitation by rights holders. As copyright law has
expanded over the last decades to extend the control of owners
76

For example, in ―The Five Step Approach for Analyzing Copyright Use Questions‖
for academics, fair use is the fourth of five steps (seeking permission is step five). The
Five Step Approach For Analyzing Copyright Use Questions, J. MURREY ATKINS LIBR.
UNC CHARLOTTE, http://library.uncc.edu/copyright/teaching/fivesteps (last visited Sept.
14, 2011). I do not to suggest that such an approach is inappropriate, but rather that
turning to fair use as a last resort has become a reality given the current state of the law.
77
See Crews, supra note 61, at 695–97 (criticizing overreliance by both the courts and
educational users on ―rigid‖ fair use guidelines, reiterating that ―[f]air use in [sic] an
inherently flexible doctrine, dependent on the specifics of the relevant facts of each case
. . . The Classroom Guidelines, the Multimedia Guidelines, and most of the fair-use
guidelines make that crucial error with emphasis. They attempt to find and hit the bull‘s
eye of a moving target.‖).
78
See Cross & Edwards, supra note 32, at 541; see also David R. Hansen, William M.
Cross & Phillip M. Edwards, Copyright Policy and Practice in Electronic Reserves
Among ARL Libraries, 73 C. & RES. LIBR. 23 (forthcoming 2012) (finding that in a recent
survey of ARL libraries on electronic course reserve practices, more than half of
respondents reported that paraprofessionals and other non-librarians were primarily
responsible for adherence to university copyright guidelines).
79
See, e.g., Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 495 (noting the lack of case law
precedent in certain on-campus fair use issues).
80
See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing the conflicted relationship
between copyright and the First Amendment).
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even further, fair use has taken on added importance as a tool used
by courts to harmonize the often conflicting goals of copyright and
the First Amendment.81 Free speech benefits are amplified in the
educational setting where academic freedom values are of
particular concern.82
In addition to free speech benefits, a healthy fair use doctrine is
thought to promote a degree of social justice and equality among
institutions of higher education.83 Wealthier institutions are able to
license access to more content, can afford to hire copyright
specialists to enable alternative uses, and can afford to evaluate
and, potentially, litigate fair use claims.84 Institutions with fewer
resources, however, are caught in a double bind. On the one hand,
less content is licensed because of the rising costs of electroniccontent licenses;85 while on the other hand, assertions of fair use—
which, if correctly determined, would allow free, unauthorized
uses—are thought to pose a risk beyond which the institution can
afford to defend.86 As explained below,87 because the strength of
fair use is in some ways dependent on how frequently it is relied
upon, a strong and sustained effort to assert fair use reduces the
risk for all institutions, and thus maintains a semblance of equality.
This has led some scholars to conclude that ―[t]he educational
community must assert and defend fair use if it is to retain some

81
See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 537, 543 (2004) (describing recent
copyright legislation as a ―one-way ratchet,‖ granting more rights for longer periods of
time, and explaining that fair use must be reinforced to maintain its role as copyright‘s
―built-in free speech safeguard,‖ harmonizing copyright restrictions with the First
Amendment).
82
Id. at 587.
83
See Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 464–65.
84
Id. at 464, 529.
85
See Kittie S. Henderson & Stephen Bosch, Seeking the New Normal: Periodicals
Price Survey 2010, 135 LIBR. J. 36, 36 (2010) (discussing the trend toward decreasing
library budgets, especially for state-supported libraries, amidst increasing subscription
costs for, among other things, electronic content).
86
See Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 465; Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright
Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 45–46 (1996) (―[F]air use is a
troublesome privilege because it requires a hideously expensive trial to prove that one‘s
actions come within its shelter.‖).
87
See infra notes 88–93 and accompanying text.
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autonomy over academic content and preserve some equity in the
delivery of its mission.‖88
The assertion of fair use is also an important end in itself.
Because fair use is context-specific and relies heavily on previous
applications in factually-analogous situations,89 the less fair use is
actually asserted, the less important it becomes. Exercise of fair
use in new and changing environments, as in the world of digital
content, is the only way to maintain fair use‘s relevance; unused,
the right will atrophy.90
This is especially true in the face of mass-licensing schemes
that are now available to academic libraries.91 Recall the fourth
fair use factor, ―the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.‖92 If libraries seek licenses to
cover uses that would otherwise be permissible under fair use, the
potential market expands, thereby decreasing the strength of fair
use.93 In examining this ―doctrinal feedback,‖ Professor James
Gibson describes the result as ―a steady, incremental, and
unintended expansion of copyright, caused by nothing more than
ambiguous doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of copyright
users.‖94 Educational fair use already suffers from a dearth of case
law. Contractual terms that make libraries and their users unable
to exert fair use in at least the ways that are currently agreed upon

88

Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 529.
See id. at 484, 488.
90
See id. at 530.
91
See, e.g., Annual Copyright License for Academic Institutions, COPYRIGHT
CLEARANCE
CTR.,
http://www.copyright.com/content/cc3/en/toolbar/productsAnd
Solutions/annualLicenseAcademic.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
92
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
93
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 887 (2007) (―This practice of unneeded licensing feeds back into
doctrine because of one final uncontroversial premise: the fair use defense looks to the
existence vel non of a licensing market when defining the reach of the copyright
entitlement. The result is a steady, incremental, and unintended expansion of copyright,
caused by nothing more than ambiguous doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of
copyright users.‖ ).
94
Id. at 887. See also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair
Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 971 (2007) (―[A] copyright owner can nearly always
argue that she has suffered harm, if only because the defendant could have paid a license
fee for the use being challenged.‖).
89
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as acceptable will result in even less definition of the right in this
context.
Each of the above-listed benefits of a strong and regularly
asserted fair use is diminished, or in extreme cases, extinguished
by overreaching licenses. By either completely removing fair use
(―The Licensee has no rights in or to the Licensed Materials other
than as set forth herein‖) or by narrowly defining terms
(―Permissible uses of a ‗Reasonable Amount‘ shall mean not more
than 10 percent of the content contained in the Licensed
Materials‖),95 the deliberately indefinite bounds of fair use are
reigned in to encompass only a fraction of its potential scope. 96 A
license term that removes fair use and replaces it with ―ten
percent,‖ ―thirty seconds‖ or any other such contrived number will
certainly give users more confidence about their use decision, but
the reduced risk also strips fair use of one of its most important
attributes—the ability to adapt and conform to new and creative
uses.97
Although it is impossible to determine the extent to which
licenses impose these restrictions (many licenses contain nondisclosure clauses that prohibit libraries from advertising such
details),98 at a certain level it does not matter. The fact that these
limitation clauses exist at all hinders the ability of students, faculty,
staff, and librarians to make assertions of fair use because they
cannot be sure that their time and effort in making that
determination will be of any use.99 Users rarely, if ever,
investigate the license terms of each and every database they use
because the transaction costs of such an investigation are too
great.100 Instead, users make decisions based on incomplete
information about particular license terms, and when that
incomplete information is tainted by a fear that fair use is not

95

Stanley Wilder, The Erosion of Fair Use Protections for Digital Scholarship,
CHARLESTON ADVISOR 57, 57–58 (2011), http://www.carli.illinois.edu/mem-serv/memtrain/1104ereslicensing/Erosion_of_fair_use.pdf (discussing both examples).
96
Id.
97
See id.
98
Ellen Finnie Duranceau, License Compliance, 26 SERIALS REV. 53, 57 (2000).
99
Id. at 53.
100
Id. at 55.
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permitted, the costly, time-consuming fair use analysis will simply
be avoided.101 Any solution that truly encourages fair use
determinations must not only make the fair use analysis a valid
exercise (by removing restrictive license terms), but must also
make it known that the right is generally a beneficial one that may
be freely asserted without the extra step of a time-consuming
investigation into confusing contractual terms.
B. Proposed Solutions
Contractual alteration of copyright‘s ―delicate balance‖
between user and author rights is well debated and a number of
proposals to preserve that balance have been suggested.102 This
section outlines three general categories of proposals, specifically
focusing on model licenses, federal preemption, and the
modification of state contract law. Each of these solutions is
appealing, but for a variety of reasons none has emerged as a
viable solution to preserving fair use in the face of mass academiclibrary licensing.
1. Model Licenses
The most obvious remedy to restrictive licensing terms is to
ask negotiating librarians not to agree to terms that give up or
modify the right of fair use for their library users. Indeed, as
University Librarian Stanley Wilder points out, ―there is no reason
to believe that contract law should be more conducive to the
erosion of fair use principles. Licenses are agreements, after all,
requiring the consent of both parties.‖103 To this end, a number of
model licenses and best practices have been developed specifically
for academic libraries.104 These guidelines offer librarians a
uniform contractual base that preserves important rights like fair
use.105 The sheer number of these model licenses is a testament to
how important the underlying goal is. The number, and indeed the

101

See id.
See generally Christina Bohannan, Copyright Preemption of Contracts, 67 MD. L.
REV. 616 (2008) (reviewing the debate).
103
See, e.g., Wilder, supra note 95, at 57.
104
See id. at 58.
105
See id.
102
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growth in new models, also speaks to how few of these licenses
have been adopted consistently by libraries.
All of the following groups have created guidelines for license
language that seeks to, at a minimum, preserve the existing scope
of fair use: American Association of Law Libraries,106 Association
of Research Libraries,107 Council on Library Resources/Digital
Library Federation,108 International Coalition of Library
Consortia,109 International Federation of Library Associations,
North Eastern Research Libraries Consortium,110 and the National
Information Standards Organization.111 Notably, all of these
guidelines are based on the idea that librarians can, and should,
negotiate with vendors to preserve rights like fair use.
Preserving fair use in the license terms themselves is a laudable
goal and should be taken up wholeheartedly by librarians who
negotiate their institutions‘ licenses. The achievement of this goal,
however, has been a long time coming. Librarians have been
proposing model language and guidelines for decades,112 but there
is little evidence that publishers are receptive to or even aware of

106
Principles for Licensing Electronic Resources, SPECIAL LIBR. ASS‘N (1997),
http://www.sla.org/content/SLA/advocacy/infobank/principles.cfm.
107
Copyright & Intellectual Property Policies, ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR.,
http://www.arl.org/pp/ppcopyright/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 30, 2011); see also
Licensing, ASS‘N OF RES. LIBR., http://www.arl.org/sc/marketplace/license/index.shtml
(last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
108
CLIR/DLF
Model
License,
YALE
UNIV.
LIBR.
LIBLICENSE,
http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/standlicagree.1st.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
109
Statement of Current Perspective and Preferred Practices for the Selection and
Purchase of Electronic Information, INT‘L COAL. OF LIBR. CONSORTIA (ICOLC),
http://www.library.yale.edu/consortia/statement.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
110
NorthEast Research Libraries Consortium Generic License Agreement for
Electronic Resources, NE. RES. LIBR. CONSORTIUM (2008), http://www.library.
yale.edu/NERLpublic/NERLGenericLicjeRev092410.pdf.
111
Shared Electronic Resource Understanding, NAT‘L INFO. STANDARDS ORG. (2008),
http://www.niso.org/publications/rp/RP-7-2008.pdf.
112
See Charles W. Bailey, Jr., Legal Issues: License Agreements, SCHOLARLY ELEC.
PUBL‘G BIBLIOGRAPHY § 5.2, http://digital-scholarship.org/sepb/llicense.htm (last updated
Oct. 30, 3011) (outlining the long history of literature on library licensing issues and the
many proposals and adoptions of model licensing language); see, e.g., Trisha L. Davis,
License Agreements in Lieu of Copyright: Are We Signing Away Our Rights?, 21 LIBR.
ACQUISITIONS: PRAC. & THEORY 19, 19–27 (1997).
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librarians‘ concerns.113 Librarians are, as Wilder points out, still
―play[ing] defense‖ with regard to licensing terms. 114 The problem
will only grow as licensing continues to become an even bigger
part of the way librarians provide access to content. This is
especially true given the proliferation of more consumer-oriented
products (and more electronic content generally).115
With
copyright owners presenting these adhesion contracts, libraries
may have little chance to ―play offense‖ and assert their own
preferred license terms.116
These standard-form, non-negotiable contracts present one area
of concern that model licenses cannot reach. Netflix, for example,
is a DVD and streaming video subscription service whose primary
customer is a consumer, not a library.117 As Netflix has grown,
libraries have added subscriptions with hopes of capitalizing on the
Netflix collection.118
Netflix‘s license terms, however, are
presented as non-negotiable, standard-form contracts directed at
consumers;119 they do not contemplate library lending, and in fact,
limit the Netflix service and content to ―personal and noncommercial use.‖120 As a result, libraries that lend out Netflixowned DVDs to library users face potential legal action for
violating the terms of use.121
113

Examples of aggressive licensing terms that restrict users‘ rights abound. Some of
the more egregious vendor terms are cataloged here: Peggy Hoon, Running In Circles:
Copyright, Licensing, and the Educational Environment, COLLECTANEA BLOG (Feb. 19,
2011, 9:13 AM), http://www-apps.umuc.edu/blog/collectanea/2011/02/running-in-circlescopyright-l.html.
114
Wilder, supra note 95.
115
See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 65–66 (1997) (discussing the development of a new market for
electronic informational services and tools).
116
See id. at 66, 71; Peggy Hoon, If You Build It, Will They Come? Customizable
Licensing, COLLECTANEA BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 1:16 PM) http://www-apps.
umuc.edu/blog/collectanea/2011/04/if-you-build-it-will-they-come.html (addressing the
practice of allowing libraries to suggest their own licensing terms).
117
See Travis Kaya, Academic Libraries Add Netflix Subscriptions, CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER ED.: WIRED CAMPUS BLOG (Sept. 18, 2010, 10:34 AM), http://chronicle.
com/blogs/wiredcampus/academic-libraries-add-netflix-subscriptions/27018.
118
See id.
119
See generally Terms of Use, NETFLIX, https://signup.netflix.com/termsofuse (last
visited Nov. 10, 2011).
120
Id.
121
See Kaya, supra note 117.
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Even with traditional academic publishers, libraries can be left
out of the licensing picture. West Publishing (―West‖), a large
legal publisher that sells millions of dollars worth of licensed
content to academic law libraries, recently released an ―interactive
casebook series‖ to accompany purchases of print casebooks.122
Although West is surely aware that it sells casebooks to law
libraries (and that law librarians—typically lawyers themselves—
will be particularly aware of licensing terms), the license for the
interactive casebook series is directed solely toward students. It
strictly limits the use of the interactive casebook to ―coursework at
law school or for bar preparation,‖123 but gives no indication as to
whether these uses may be personal or institutional. Moreover, it
is silent on the issue of whether libraries are permitted to access
content on behalf of users. Stock licenses like these, which leave
no opportunity for negotiation, are blunt-force instruments that
achieve the goals of neither the library nor the publisher. But
libraries, increasingly forced to act as purchasing agents for
consumer-users, simply do not have a way to assert alternative
licensing terms for these products.
Admittedly, Nextflix and West‘s interactive casebook are
examples of products that are relatively unimportant in the grand
scheme of the electronic content to which academic libraries
provide access. They are, however, good illustrations of the
limited usefulness of model licenses. Model license language is
only effective if publishers are willing to negotiate. As the world
of licensed electronic content grows, it is unlikely that libraries
will represent a large enough segment of the customer population
to warrant special attention from publishers in all areas, and
without that attention, there is no ―playing defense‖ or ―playing
122
West Interactive Casebook Series, INTERACTIVE CASEBOOK SERIES,
http://interactivecasebook.com/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
123
License Agreement, INTERACTIVE CASEBOOK SERIES, http://interactivecasebook.
com/license/licenseagreement.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2011). Read literally, these
license terms would seem to prohibit faculty use as well, although the site registration
form clearly contemplates faculty registration. See Create a New Account, INTERACTIVE
CASEBOOK SERIES, http://interactivecasebook.com/register.aspx (last visited Apr. 30,
2011) (allowing for special registration for law school faculty in order to gain access to
―Professor Only‖ materials). To its credit, the license does specifically allow for uses ―as
allowed under the fair use provision of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.A. § 107).‖ Id.
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offense.‖124 There is no game at all. These areas of consumeroriented licensing are growing, and for library users who are
making costly and time-consuming fair use decisions, the added
burden of evaluating multifarious licensing terms is great. 125 Thus,
model licenses, even if uniformly adopted and vigorously
negotiated (which they are not), can only ease a portion of the
burden imposed by a licensing culture, and must still accept
consumer-oriented licenses that are outside the model licenses‘
reach.
2. Federal Preemption
One of the most appealing proposals, at least from a legal
perspective, is the suggestion that Congress or the courts should
declare that federal copyright law—and in particular, the right of
fair use—preempts any contract provisions to the contrary.126 The
logic is straight forward: licenses are creatures of state contract
law, and state laws are generally valid only so long as they do not
conflict with federal law on the same subject matter.127 Federal
124

See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 115, at 66 (discussing the low bargaining
power of database users or customers).
125
See Gasaway, supra note 53, at 154–55.
126
See Bohannan, supra note 102, at 629–35. A less drastic variation would be one that
supports preemption only for specific contract provisions that purport to restrict the
limitations on exclusive rights, such as the fair use right, if the contract is not nonnegotiable. Such an approach has been proposed in Congress but has failed. See Benefit
Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act
of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003) (―When a digital work is distributed to the public
subject to nonnegotiable license terms, such terms shall not be enforceable under the
common laws or statutes of any State to the extent that they restrict or limit any of the
limitations on exclusive rights under this title.‖). See also Kevin Smith, Copyright
Renewal for Libraries: Seven Steps Toward a User-Friendly Law, 10 PORTAL: LIBR. AND
THE ACAD. 5, 9–11 (2010) (discussing the proposal). This approach would potentially be
easier to implement than wholesale preemption, but because the language of the existing
preemption statute is specifically worded, it would be difficult for courts to read in such a
restriction under the existing law. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, as a legislative solution, such a proposal would suffer from many of the
same problems as wholesale preemption would, but the difficultly may be less
exaggerated. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. These uncertainties suggest
that this option should be further explored.
127
This is only a rough generalization of the actual rule. Federal preemption can follow
two routes, ―express preemption‖ (where the statute explicitly states that it preempts state
law) or ―implied preemption,‖ which, in turn, can take the form of either ―conflict
preemption‖ (where courts must determine whether the state law actually conflicts with
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law is, in the words of the Constitution‘s supremacy clause, the
―supreme law of the land.‖128 Because copyright and the right of
fair use are created by federal law, those rights should not be
alterable by state-law created contracts. This position is supported
by the fact that the courts, under an express provision of the
copyright act which directs the courts to find preemption for
―equivalent rights,‖129 have regularly held that federal copyright
law preempts state laws granting ―equivalent rights‖ to those
enumerated in the federal copyright law.130
Federal preemption has a number of strengths. It would
produce a uniform, nationwide rule.
It would also more
legitimately restore the current imbalance of rights between users
and copyright holders; if Congress used federal law to create a
balance of rights, then federal law should be used to maintain that
balance. Although there is some concern about how such a
federal-only rule would work,131 these benefits, among others,
have led many to support this approach to preemption.132
Despite scholarly commentary that roundly supports federal
preemption of contract restrictions,133 courts have generally

the purpose of the federal statute) or ―field preemption‖ (where the federal statutory
scheme is so broad as to ―occupy the field‖ in that area of law). A thorough discussion of
preemption doctrine in the context of copyright can be found in 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B] (LexisNexis 2011) [hereinafter
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
128
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
129
17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
130
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, § 1.01[B][1][b]–[k] (discussing cases
that have held that federal law preempts certain state law claims for breach of fiduciary
duty, invasion of privacy or publicity, defamation, deceptive trade practices,
misappropriation, unjust enrichment, trade secrets, conversion, trespass, and other causes
of action).
131
For example, if state contract law is preempted as a whole with respect to
copyrighted works, what contract law would apply? Federal common law?
132
Bohannan, supra note 102, at 622–30.
133
See id. at 634 (―[T]he thrust of the scholarly criticism of ProCD has been that
contracts, especially form contracts such as shrinkwrap licenses, alter the ‗delicate
balance‘ of rights established by the Copyright Act, and must therefore be preempted.‖).
See also Maureen A. O‘Rourke, Drawing the Boundary between Copyright and
Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995);
Joel R. Wolfson, Contracts and Copyright are not at War: A Reply to ―The
Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand‖, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 82 (1999); Kathleen K.
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concluded that contracts which modify or replace copyright-related
rights are nonetheless valid.134 In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,135
Judge Easterbrook reasoned,
Rights ―equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright‖ are rights
established by law—rights that restrict the options
of persons who are strangers to the author. . . .
Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their
parties; strangers may do as they please, so
contracts do not create ―exclusive rights.‖136
Thus, the court concluded that ―a simple two-party contract is
not ‗equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright‘ and therefore may be enforced.‖137
While other courts have taken a less categorical approach to
preemption,138 the general point remains that contractual
restrictions on usage are valid, even when those restrictions
conflict with federal rights such as fair use.139 Many federal
circuits have adopted some version of the ProCD holding,140 and

Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and Constitutional Preemption of
Contract-Based Claims, 11 COMM. L. & POL‘Y 83, 84 (2006).
134
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, § 1.01[B][1][a][iii].
135
86 F.3d 1447 (1996).
136
Id. at 1454.
137
Id. at 1455.
138
E.g., Nat‘l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Comp. Assocs. Int‘l, 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir.
1993) (implicitly adopting the ―extra element‖ rule, whereby a contractual obligation
constitutes an ―extra element‖ for enforcement that goes beyond the bare exclusive rights
granted by copyright). The extra element approach, in at least some circuits, is in reality
just as categorical—the only extra element that needs to be proved is that a contractual
promise exists in addition to the underlying exclusive right granted by § 106. See
Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488, 1501 (5th Cir. 1990).
139
While recognizing that it is the courts that have been the source of the current
contract preemption rule, recent reform efforts continue to hope that the judiciary will
reverse course on the issue. See Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The
Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 60
(2010) (presenting a list of factors to consider in the preemption analysis, but noting that
―[t]hese factors are not intended as a multi-part balancing test or for statutory
codification, but rather as suggestions for some considerations relevant to resolving,
through case-by-case development, the ultimate question of whether enforcing a given
contract right in a given set of circumstances will frustrate copyright‘s purposes.‖).
140
Bohannan, supra note 102, at 633.
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there is little evidence that the courts are looking to reverse course
on this issue.141
Congress could, in theory, change the preemption rule to make
it clear that state contract terms are preempted. In reality,
however, such a change is unlikely. Such a change in course on
this issue would almost certainly result in an expansion of users‘
rights in the Copyright Act142—something Congress has rarely
done before. In fact, over the last century, copyright has expanded
to give authors and their assignees more rights over more formats
for a longer period of time.143 An expansion of users‘ rights would
be unprecedented and extremely difficult.144 This area of the law
is subject to intense lobbying145 pulling the politics toward more
rights for holders of concentrated blocks of copyrights, and away
from the rights of individual or even institutional users. Further,
although some in Congress have signaled a willingness to consider
users‘ rights issues, the past two Congresses have produced over
thirty copyright-related bills, only one of which would have even
arguably expanded users‘ rights.146 Political attitudes can, of
course, change quickly, and the scope of users‘ rights is not set in
stone. At the federal level,147 however, an apparent disparity
141
See, e.g., BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 614–17
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reviewing the Second Circuit intra-circuit split on preemption and
noting an overall trend toward following ProCD, the court opted to adopt the reasoning
of Judge Easterbrook‘s ProCD decision).
142
See Samuelson & Members of the CPP, supra note 139, at 59–62 (noting that failing
to change course, and allowing such preemption, places limitations on users‘ rights).
143
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, §1-TL. In 1962, Congress extended the
copyright term from a maximum of 56 to 75 years, then the Copyright Act of 1976
extended the term further to cover the life of the author plus 50 years. Id. §1-OV. Finally,
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension act then extended the term even further to
cover the life of the author plus 70 years. Id. During this period, Congress has also
extended protection to works such as computer software and architectural works. Id.
144
This is despite the numerous proposals for copyright reform, focusing particularly
on the fair use right. See, e.g., supra note 66.
145
According to the Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, nearly a billion dollars
were spent last year on lobbying related to issues of ―COPYRIGHT / PATENT /
TRADEMARK.‖ See LDA Reports, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/
Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
146
See Copyright Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/
legislation/archive (last visited Aug. 12, 2011) (listing copyright-related bills dating back
to the 105th Congress).
147
See LDA Reports, supra note 145.
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currently exists: the relative lobbying strength of parties primarily
concerned with greater copyright protection for authors is much
greater than those whose primary concern is access (such as
academic libraries).
Accordingly, Congress‘s interest in
addressing these issues is likely limited.
Still, options remain to change the law on this point; courts
could reverse the trend toward finding no preemption, or Congress
could act. But given the inaction of both the courts and Congress
over the last two decades—a period of time in which the ―debate
has been raging‖ over contractual preemption148—such a change
seems unlikely. Academic library users must look elsewhere for
the time being.
3. Wholesale Modification of State Contract Law
A wholesale modification of state contract law is another way
to address the issue. Although not well discussed by scholars,
states could simply decide that any contractual provisions—as
between any grouping of public or private parties—which limit or
modify the right of fair use are void as against public policy. This
approach, while worthy of further investigation, seems unlikely to
be easily implemented by either federal or state courts, or by state
legislatures.
Federal courts, for their part, are unlikely to alter state contract
law in any meaningful way because it is simply not theirs to alter.
As discussed above, federal courts have accepted as a matter of
course that ―state law determines the rights and obligations arising
under a publishing contract that assigns a copyright.‖149 While
federal courts are free to exercise jurisdiction over state law
contract claims that are supplemental or ancillary to an underlying
federal claim (such as copyright infringement),150 expanding or
modifying settled issues in state law is decidedly outside the realm

148

Bohannan, supra note 102, at 616.
Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1996).
150
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). The original grant of jurisdiction over copyright suits
comes from 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006), although general federal question jurisdiction,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006), would also seem to be sufficient.
149
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of permissible federal court activity.151 Thus, federal courts will
apply state law as it exists, and will not initiate changes.
State courts, which have traditionally played an important role
in developing contract law, are also unlikely to alter the law in this
area for at least two reasons. First, courts are conservative when it
comes to changing contract law. Exceptions to the principle of
freedom of contract—cast as public policy exceptions and viewed
as consumer protections—are difficult to initiate152 and raise
151

See, e.g., Railroad Comm‘n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–501 (1943)
(―But no matter how seasoned the judgment of the district court may be, it cannot escape
being a forecast rather than a determination. The last word on the meaning of [the state
law] . . . belongs neither to us nor to the district court but to the supreme court of [the
state]. . . . Few public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal
chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies. . . . These cases
reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal
courts, ‗exercising a wise discretion,‘ restrain their authority because of ‗scrupulous
regard for the rightful independence of the state governments‘ and for the smooth
working of the federal judiciary.‖).
152
Almost always prefaced by language such as ―that parties are free to contract for
whatever terms on which they may agree,‖ Hanks v. Powder Ridge Rest. Corp., 276
Conn. 314, 326, 885 A.2d 734, 742 (2005), courts have most often created public policy
exceptions with respect to exculpatory provisions that seek to insulate one party from her
own ordinary negligence. See 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:22 (4th ed. 2011). The
factors that justify these exceptions, however, also provide a powerful argument for the
acceptance of a ―fair use‖ public policy exception:
Thus the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transaction
which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It
concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public
regulation. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of
practical necessity for some members of the public. The party holds
himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the
public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain
established standards. As a result of the essential nature of the
service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking
exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength
against any member of the public who seeks his services. In
exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no
provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees
and obtain protection against negligence. Finally, as a result of the
transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under
the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the
seller or his agents.
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445–46 (Cal. 1963).
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serious concerns from courts about paternalism and the role of the
court in creating, and possibly conflicting with, other public
policies. 153
Second, even if state courts wanted to address this issue, state
courts never have the opportunity to actually hear contract disputes
in the copyright context. Federal district courts are explicitly
granted original jurisdiction over copyright cases,154 and that
jurisdiction is ―exclusive of the courts of the states.‖155 Exclusive
jurisdiction means that federal courts—and only federal courts—
can hear copyright disputes.156 Because licensing disputes are
invariably tied to an underlying copyright claim (necessarily so, if
fair use is asserted), the federal courts are the only forum available
to hear both copyright and contract claims together. Thus, state
courts are in the curious position of never having an opportunity to
clarify what their own law is, while federal courts are obliged to
conservatively apply state law as they believe it currently exists.
While the courts may be unable to properly address the issue,
state legislatures may. In the past, state legislatures have indicated
some willingness to modify contract law to deal with electronic
licensing issues. The Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (―UCITA,‖ formerly UCC Article 2B)157 was designed to be
153

Although more reflection is necessary, such a change in the general rules of contract
construction could arguably cause a conflict with ―copyright policy‖ (perhaps a principle
of freedom of contract, as implied in ProCD), and may be overridden by federal law.
―Usually, state law rules of contract construction do not violate federal copyright policy,
and the two work hand in glove. . . . But, if and to the extent that such dissonance may
occur, the state law, of course, must give way to the federal policy.‖ NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 127, § 10.08. Whatever these policy conflicts are, they have been
described as ―extreme situations.‖ See Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int‘l., Inc., 661
F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (―It is possible to hypothesize situations where application
of particular state rules of construction would so alter rights granted by the copyright
statutes as to invade the scope of copyright law or violate its policies. We need not,
however, set forth these extreme situations.‖).
154
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
UCC Art. 2B (1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/
ulc/ucc2/2b498.htm; UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (1999)
[hereinafter UCITA] available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucita/ucita
200.htm. The UCITA was originally proposed as part of UCC Art. 2B, but is now a
separate act. See Article 2B Is Withdrawn from UCC and Will Be Promulgated by
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adopted by states as a way to uniformly regulate license terms
related to software purchases, online databases, software access
contracts and similar transactions. The UCITA, as it happens, was
strongly opposed by libraries as an affront to library services like
interlibrary loan and library lending of electronic media like CDROMs and DVDs.158 Librarians argued that it would also ―restrict
traditional ‗fair use‘ of a product by defining what rights buyers
have in relation to an information product‖ by validating licenses
terms that are hidden ―deep within online licenses that are not
readily available before purchase.‖159 In the end, only two states—
Virginia and Maryland—adopted the UCITA,160 and four states
have instead adopted so-called ―bomb shelter‖ legislation to shield
their residents from being subject to UCITA-governed contracts.161
While it has been more than ten years since the UCITA was
proposed,162 its existence and the states‘ reaction with bomb shelter
legislation indicates at least a willingness on the part of state
legislatures to address the issues, albeit in different ways.
Modification of state contract law as a whole, however, is a
major undertaking that would have a widespread impact on
consumers and businesses. A more in-depth study is necessary to
determine how state contract law may be modified to preserve fair
use and other federally-created rights. Because states have been
hesitant to rush into studying or implementing such sweeping
changes, this paper makes a more modest proposal.
II. A RESTRICTION ON PUBLIC ACADEMIC LICENSING
To protect the scope of fair use in the academic environment,
this paper proposes that state legislatures impose a limited

NCCUSL as Separate Act, ALI REP. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ali.org/ali_old/R2103_
Art2b.htm.
158
See UCITA Impact on Libraries, AM. LIBR. ASS‘N, http://www.ala.org/ala/
issuesadvocacy/copyright/ucita/impact.cfm (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
159
Id.
160
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-101 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1501.9 (West 2011).
161
See IOWA CODE § 554D.104 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-329 (2011), VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9 § 2463a (2011); W. VA. CODE § 55-8-15 (2011).
162
See UCITA, supra note 158.
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restriction, applicable only to public institutions of higher
education, that would render void any license terms that purport to
eliminate or modify the scope of fair use for its users. For legal,
equitable, and practical reasons, the restriction would apply only to
new contracts entered into after the act‘s effective date,163 and
would reach only to those institutions that are acting as arms of the
state.164
A. Proposed Text
Restrictions on contract terms between private parties and state
institutions are fairly common. In North Carolina, for example,
state institutions are prohibited from agreeing to a whole host of
contract terms, including provisions that provide for: acceleration
of payment, arbitration, assignment of rights, governing law,
indemnity, hold harmless, assumption of liability, limitation of
liability, liquidated damages, material breach, irreparable harm,
statute of limitations, and non-compete clauses.165 An additional
requirement that state institutions may not contract away the right
of fair use for its users would not represent a significant burden on
state institutions either in terms of compliance or actual licensing
expenditures.
The draft text below is but one way to approach this issue. It is
offered as a point of discussion for one possible implementation of
this proposal. Although drafted as part of the statutory law of a
given state, the contract restrictions described below could easily
be implemented as either a state regulation, or as a university
governing-board level policy.166 As long as the provisions are
non-waivable and are binding on the institution for all contracts,

163

Applying the change retroactively may run afoul of the Constitutional command that
―No State shall . . . pass any bill . . . or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.‖ U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. See United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
21–32 (1977) (explaining the application of the Contract Clause to modifications of
government contracts).
164
As opposed to private institutions that only incidentally receive some minimal level
of state funding.
165
See Negotiating Prohibited Contract Clauses, OFF. OF LEG. AFFAIRS, UNC
CHARLOTTE, http://legal.uncc.edu/prohibitedclauses.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
166
See 1 GOV‘T CONTRACTS: LAW, ADMIN. & PROCS. § 1.120 (2011) (noting the diverse
ways that state and local governments structure their procurement statutes).
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the effect would be the same. A more complete example of
proposed text for this Act is attached as an appendix to this paper.
The first part of the proposed act lays the groundwork for licensing
practices regarding fair use provisions. It provides
No publicly supported college or university, as
defined in [statutory definition], shall enter into any
contract or license which alters, restricts, or
eliminates any of the fair use rights or defenses
granted in Section 107 of Title 17 of the United
States Code. State supported colleges and
universities may comply with this provision by
incorporating the following language: [compliance
language].
This provision disallows universities themselves from entering
into contracts that restrict fair use. Although such language may
not be completely necessary given the second paragraph (below,
which renders void those contract terms anyway), the first
paragraph forestalls any equitable defense of estoppel or waiver
that vendors could potentially raise if institutions continued to
assent to restrictive contract terms, even while knowing that the
terms themselves should be rendered void.167 This term also
ensures that licenses on file with the institution would not contain
restrictive language, allowing librarians and users to confidently
assert fair use for the licensed works without second guessing the
validity of the contract.
The first paragraph leaves open the definition of ―state
supported college or university.‖ Many states already have
statutory definitions or lists of state-funded academic institutions
that would be appropriate for reference here.168 The important

167

This concern may not be well-founded, but is included in an abundance of caution.
A defense of waiver or estoppel would be unlikely to succeed given the second
paragraph. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 369 (2011) (―Generally, as between the parties to a
contract, validity cannot be given to it by estoppel if it is prohibited by law or is against
public policy. Thus, an agreement which is void as against public policy, or because
prohibited by law, cannot be rendered valid by invoking the doctrine of estoppel.‖).
168
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115D-2 (2011) (defining community colleges); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 116-2 (2011) (defining constituent institutions of the University of North
Carolina System). Other states leave the definition of specific entities to state agencies.
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point is that states should be as inclusive as possible and capture as
many state-funded institutions as possible within the definition. As
discussed above,169 the inability of underfunded institutions to
freely exercise and challenge fair use determinations contributes to
the inequity of access to information as between those institutions
and their well-funded counterparts.170 States should resist applying
these provisions only to flagship universities or research-intensive
institutions. Community colleges, small universities, and other
institutions with relatively small amounts of resources would
benefit from these provisions as well.
As a final matter, the first paragraph also provides model
compliance language that institutions may incorporate into their
contracts to ensure compliance with the previous sentences. This
provision is designed to reduce administrative and negotiating
costs on the part of universities. Where this language is
incorporated, there is no doubt that the contract is in compliance
with the statute‘s terms and that fair use rights are preserved for
library users.

See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66700 (West 2011) (leaving the definition and establishment of
community colleges to the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges).
169
See Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 529; see also supra notes 83–87 and
accompanying text (discussing why the assertion of fair use is important in allowing
institutions of higher education to ―retain some autonomy over academic content and
preserve some equity in the delivery of its mission.‖).
170
Another option is to simply apply the provisions to all arms of the state, regardless
of educational purpose. One way of deciding which agencies to include under this
broader-reaching directive might be to just adopt the test of which state agencies are
covered by the 11th Amendment. Because they are exempt from damage awards, those
agencies would pose a lower risk in terms of potential damages awards under the
Copyright Act, which can be substantial. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the test for 11th Amendment applicability is often phrased in terms that
support this paper‘s proposal as a funding, rather than ideological, restriction on what the
state should be paying for:
Six factors determine whether an entity is an arm of the state: ―(1)
how the entity is referred to in its documents of origin; (2) how the
governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is
funded; (4) whether the entity‘s function is traditionally one of local
or state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the
entity‘s actions; and (6) whether the entity‘s financial obligations are
binding upon the state.‖
Gorton v. Gettel, 554 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting McGinty v. New York, 251
F.3d 84, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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The second paragraph does most of the work. Its provides that
Any contract or license term, between any person or
entity and a state supported college or university, as
defined in [statutory definition], which alters,
restricts, or eliminates any of the fair use rights and
defenses granted in 17 U.S.C. § 107 shall be
rendered void and against the public policy of
[state]. The provisions of the previous sentence
shall only apply to contracts entered into after the
effective date of this Act.
This paragraph does two things. First, it renders void any
contract terms that restrict the scope of fair use. It makes clear that
even in the case of an institution that ignores the first paragraph,
those contract terms are nonetheless void. Second, it applies the
terms of this provision only to new contracts, avoiding problems
with the Constitutional prohibition on impairments of contracts.171
B. Strengths and Weaknesses
The major benefit of this kind of legislation is that it allows
academic libraries and their users to freely assert fair use without
the burden of contractual restrictions that render the fair use
analysis meaningless. Unlike the model licenses, a uniform rule
that applies to all state institution contracts will give users some
degree of certainty that their efforts in making the fair use analysis
are meaningful and valid.
Likewise, this approach avoids the problems of wholesale
modification of state contract law, which would constitute a
sweeping change to the way businesses and consumers, as well as
state institutions, contract for copyrighted goods. To be sure, this
is an area ripe for more study, in particular to examine the way
such a sweeping change might be implemented for other classes of
171

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Though, in enacting this provision as a matter of
public policy, the state may have some footing to assert retroactive application. ―[T]he
reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the state is read into all
contracts . . . .‖ Home Bldg. & Loan Ass‘n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934). This
may be especially true of a state-law protection of fair use—a right that is unlikely to be
heavily used even without contractual restrictions, and a right that is provided in federal
law in part to protect First Amendment free speech rights.
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users or for consumers as a whole, with due regard for issues of
federalism, statutory preemption, and dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence. While changes to state contract law as a whole may
be desirable, those changes are undoubtedly more difficult than
this paper‘s more modest proposal. Contractual restrictions that
apply only to state institutions represent an incremental step in the
same direction, but are less jarring because they apply only to a
specialized set of copyrighted content purchasers. Further, for
many institutions the change in licensing practices would be small.
Many libraries already strive to preserve fair use with model
license language,172 and this proposal simply makes those license
terms non-negotiable.173
Because this approach represents only an incremental change,
it also has a legitimate chance of being implemented. State
legislatures have shown some interest in modifying their laws to
meet the demands of electronic licensing issues, but wholesale
changes to contract law are more difficult because of the
widespread impact those changes would have. States have
regularly created self-imposed restrictions on government contract
practices, many of them similar to this proposal.174
As compared to changes to federal copyright law itself, this
state-level approach is not necessarily preferable. It does however,
represent a more achievable level of change than other proposals
made thus far. At the federal level, Congress is unlikely to act.
Generating and passing legislation at the federal level is an
incredibly difficult process.175 Moreover, legislation that benefits
copyright users or academic institutions is far outside the current

172

See, e.g., CLIR/DLF Model License, supra note 108; UNIV. OF CAL. COLLECTION
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, Principles for Acquiring and Licensing Information in
Digital Formats, UNIV. OF CAL. LIBR. (2006), http://libraries.universityof
california.edu/cdc/principlesforacquiring.html.
173
In contrast to the non-negotiable adhesion contracts discussed above, that had the
effect of severely restricting, if not eliminating fair use, this non-negotiable regulation or
contract provision in state institution contracts would ensure full access to fair use rights,
and would protect the arguably less sophisticated party in any negotiation over other
terms.
174
See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
175
See generally The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.gov/content/learn/legislative_process (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
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realm of legislative proposals; instead, federal lobbying is tilted
toward protection of existing content owners.176
States legislatures may be more likely to act on this issue for
two reasons. First, the restriction is in the state‘s own best
interest—it is, after all, their state budgets that underwrite public
university access to these databases. Public university funding can
be heavily scrutinized, and state legislatures have a very real
interest in seeing that their universities get the most for their
money. Congress, by comparison, has less of a direct financial
interest in users‘ rights because it does not have to pay for this
content. Second, the lobbying dynamic at the state level may be
more considerate of the interests of large state institutional
stakeholders. At the state level, public university lobbying can be
relatively influential, given its size and economic impact on the
particular states, as compared to at the federal level. These two
reasons for adopting a state-level approach may, of course, vary
significantly from state to state and from time to time, and it is
difficult to state with certainty how these dynamics would play out
in reality. The stagnation of solutions from the federal level,
however, makes the state level approach one option worth
pursuing.
Ultimately, however, the strength of this proposal as a small,
incremental, local change may also be its weakness. For one, it
may not do enough. This proposal focuses on a narrow change in
the law that applies only to state institutions. Private institutions,
however, experience many of the same licensing problems that
public institutions experience.177 Private institutions would feel
some spill-over effects because vendors would have to justify why
they can concede fair-use protections in state licenses but not in
private licenses, but the benefit is less direct. Private institutions
would also not experience the same level of uniformity among
their licenses. Because any gains in fair-use protections would still
be negotiable with vendors, private users might still face
uncertainty in determining the value of the fair use analysis with
respect to work taken from any given database.
176
177

See LDA Reports, supra note 145.
See McDowell, supra note 63, at A1.
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The opposite side of this weakness is that public institutions
may be at a competitive disadvantage when bargaining with
vendors. Because public institutions would now have to insist on
contract terms that private institutions would not, public
institutions may be forced to pay higher prices than their private
counterparts. This problem may be exacerbated if only one or a
few states implement this papers‘ proposed change, leaving a small
and discrete group of institutions against which rights holders may
discriminate in pricing licensing contracts. Although existing
contractual restrictions on state institutions have not resulted in an
appreciable price difference between public and private licenses,
terms that preserve fair use rights may come at some cost to public
institutions.
On balance, the negative aspects of this limited proposal are
outweighed by the fact that some change is needed, and alternative
solutions are either unlikely to be implemented or are simply
ineffective and unenforceable by themselves. Further, the small
changes suggested here should be thought of as a first step toward
restoring balance between copyright owners‘ and users‘ rights.
Applying these contract restrictions to private institutions, or to the
public at large, may be a logical next step.
III. OTHER AREAS FOR STATE LAW LICENSE RESTRICTIONS
Restrictions on state contracting may be used to protect other
important copyright-related rights in ways that are currently
impossible under existing federal law. One area that may be
amenable to this type of change would be rules of contract
construction in determining the distinction between a sale and a
license. The doctrine of first sale allows libraries to ―sell or
otherwise dispose of‖ copies of works that they have legally
purchased—that is, particular copies over which the library is the
―owner,‖ not merely a licensee.178 This right justifies library
lending and is vital to the distribution of single-copy digital media
in physical formats (DVD or CD, usually).179 Recent federal cases

178
179

17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
Id.
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have challenged the stability of the first-sale doctrine as applied to
these formats,180 and carefully drafted state restrictions on the
ability of vendors to easily substitute ―licensee‖ status over
―owner‖ status for libraries (or users in general) may be beneficial.
Another application may be to promote author-archiving in
open-access repositories, as an alternate way that university, statefunded authors can make their works available. Universities in
particular fund a large amount of creative content, but they pay for
it twice—once in faculty salaries, and a second time through
licensing contracts that purchase back access for many of the very
same works that faculty have authored.181 Academic authors rarely
receive direct compensation for their writing, and universities also
see no direct revenue for those activities.182 Thus, the lifecycle of
scholarly communication involves significant and repeated outlays
by scholars and their universities, with little direct benefit for
either the institution or, in the case of public institutions, the
citizens of the state that supports the institution. Requiring that
state institutions maintain public or, at a minimum, institutional
access to works which they have already funded through salaries
would be one way to partially avoid these double payments.
At the federal level, funding agencies, such as the National
Institutes of Health183 and the National Science Foundation,184

180
See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
restrictions on sale of second-hand software were valid license terms not subject to first
sale doctrine); Complaint, Ass‘n for Info. Media & Equip. et al v. Regents of The Univ.
of Cal. et al., No. CV 10-9378 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010), available at
http://dockets.justia.com/docket/california/cacdce/2:2010cv09378/489296/ (asserting that
DVDs held by the UCLA are subject to licenses which prohibit reuse or copying for
―time‖ and ―format‖ shifting purposes). See generally Parzanowski & Schultz, supra
note 1 (exploring in detail the problems courts have faced when applying the first sale
doctrine to digitally distributed materials).
181
See generally Gerhardt & Wessel, supra note 74, at 464.
182
Lloyd L. Weinred, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149,
1233 (1998).
183
NAT‘L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH Public Access Policy Details, NAT‘L INSTS. OF
HEALTH PUBLIC ACCESS (Apr. 30, 2011) http://publicaccess.nih.gov/policy.htm (―[A]ll
investigators funded by the NIH submit or have submitted for them to the National
Library of Medicine‘s PubMed Central an electronic version of their final, peer-reviewed
manuscripts upon acceptance for publication, to be made publicly available no later than
12 months after the official date of publication . . . .‖).
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have seen success in conditioning funding on the requirement that
authors make the published results of their research available in an
open-access repository.185 ARL libraries have already suggested
model language that conditions licenses between publishers and
libraries on the condition that those same publishers grant
institutionally-affiliated authors the right to archive their works in
open-access repositories.186 Making those archiving rights for
authors mandatory through contractual restrictions on public
institutions would further that initiative.187
CONCLUSION
Contracts can do funny things to the balance of rights granted
by Congress in the Copyright Act. For public institutions that
spend large amounts of money on copyrighted content, contractual
restrictions on users‘ rights are especially problematic given the
needs of academic library patrons. In recent years, academic
libraries have experienced a dramatic shift in the acquisitions
practice—from purchasing physical copies of works to licensing
access to those works. With this shift toward licensing, academic
library users‘ rights under federal copyright law have been
diminished. In particular, these restrictions have narrowed the
scope of fair use, a right whose free exercise is important to
academic freedom and equity across institutions of higher
education. These contractual limitations alter the delicate balance
of author and user rights, and have garnered significant criticism
184

NSF Data Management Plan Requirements, NAT‘L SCI. FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2011),
http://www.nsf.gov/eng/general/dmp.jsp.
185
Support for these mandates has not been universal and legislation has been
introduced to discontinue the practice. See Fair Copyright in Research Works Act, H.R.
801, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2009) (―No Federal agency may, in connection with a funding
agreement . . . impose or cause the imposition of any term or condition that . . . requires
the transfer or license to or for a Federal agency . . . .‖).
186
Model Language, AUTHOR RIGHTS MODEL LICENSING LANGUAGE http://authorrights.
wordpress.com/model-language (last visited Apr. 30, 2011).
187
Unlike the preservation of a federally created balance of rights, however, a
mandatory license term which dictates author self-archiving rights would venture
dangerously close to granting an ―equivalent right,‖ that may be preempted by federal
copyright law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 127
§ 1.01[B]. Thus, the boundaries of this application and the possibility of preemption
should be further explored.
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from scholars. Thus far, proposals to restore the balance have not
been effective because they are either too ambitious (as with
federal preemption) or too weak (as with model licenses). This
paper proposes a solution that falls between those two extremes,
and which may be useful to rebalance the rights of content owners
and users with respect to other academic uses as well.
Academic library users are not, however, the only group of
users that are negatively impacted by licensing restrictions on
rights like fair use. As the digital distribution of copyrighted
works becomes more common, consumers are presented with the
same problems as those in academia. Because contracts—
creatures of state law—are what enable these problems, state
courts and legislatures should give serious thought to modifying
state contract law, either for individual classes of users (as this
paper proposes), or for consumers in general.
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED TEXT FOR STATE CONTRACT LIMITS ON FAIR
USE RESTRICTIONS
EDUCATIONAL FAIR USE PRESERVATION ACT
To amend the General Statues, to preserve educational fair use
for state college and university library users.
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the
―Educational Fair Use Preservation Act of 2011.‖
SECTION 2. FINDINGS.
Whereas, [state] seeks to support the academic mission of its
colleges and universities by providing access to educational and
research materials to the greatest extent possible,
Whereas, it is also the policy of the state of [state] to take
advantage of the rights and defenses provided under the federal
copyright laws,
Whereas, state supported colleges and universities pay high
and increasing fees associated with the provision of electronically
distributed works, while at the same time ceding rights and
defenses of federal copyright law through restrictive licensing
terms,
Whereas, those reductions in rights and defenses are impacting
the core academic mission of state supported colleges and
universities,
Whereas, the most egregious of these reductions involves a
contractual modifications to the scope of fair use, as provided for
in Section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code, a right which
is of central importance to academic writing and research,
Therefore,
SECTION 3. NO CONTRACTS RESTRICTING FAIR
USE.
―Sec 101. Restriction on College or University Contracts.
―(a)—Restriction
―No publicly supported college or university, as defined in
[statutory definition], shall enter into any contract or license which

HANSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

44

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

12/12/2011 1:57 PM

[Vol. 22:1

alters, restricts, or eliminates any of the fair use rights or defenses
granted in Section 107 of Title 17 of the United States Code.
―(b)— Compliance Language
―State supported colleges and universities may comply with
this provision by incorporating the following language in contracts
and licenses:
―In accordance with the Educational Fair Use Preservation Act
of 2011, nothing in this contract shall be construed to restrict
[name of college or university] or its users from asserting the rights
or defenses of fair use, as provided by Section 107 of Title 17 of
the United States Code.
SECTION 4. FAIR USE RESTRICTIONS VOID.
―Sec. 201. Fair Use Restrictions Void
―(a)— Restrictions Void
―Any contract or license term, between any person or entity
and a state supported college or university, as defined in [statutory
definition], which alters, restricts, or eliminates any of the fair use
rights and defenses granted in 17 U.S.C. § 107 shall be rendered
void as against the public policy of the [state].
―(b)— Date of Application
―The provisions of Subsection (a) shall only apply to contracts
entered into after the effective date of this Act.

